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The last thirty years have witnessed two important developments in financial markets.
First, a rapid pace of financial innovation has made it possible to slice and combine a
large variety of risks by trading a rich set of financial instruments. Second, the man-
agement of large amounts of capital has been delegated to entities such as hedge funds
and bank proprietary desks that are neither subject to significant trading restrictions
nor required to disclose publicly the details of their positions.
The amount of capital available to such entities crucially depends on investors’
perceptions of their “alpha” - that is, their ability to generate excess returns above
the level of fair compensation for risk. Combined with the relative opaqueness of these
entities and their vast risk-taking opportunities, this creates room for a particular type
of agency problem.
Fund managers who are running out of alpha-generating strategies may find it
tempting to pretend otherwise, and to take risky positions with zero or even negative
alpha that may temporarily improve their perceived reputation in case of favorable
outcomes. Strategies that generate frequent small positive excess returns that are offset
by very rare and large losses seem especially well suited to disguising luck as skill. As
Rajan (2008) puts it: “How can untalented investment managers justify their pay?
Unfortunately, all too often it is by creating fake alpha – appearing to create excess
returns but actually taking on hidden tail risk.” Consistent with this view, Jiang and
Kelly (2012) showed that a significant number of hedge funds are indeed exposed to
tail risk.
Creating fake alpha by taking on hidden tail risk does not seem to be limited to
the hedge fund industry. For example, in its 2008 report to shareholders intended to
analyze the causes of its subprime losses, UBS concluded that “The UBS compensation
and incentivization structure did not effectively differentiate between the creation of al-
pha versus the creation of return based on a low cost of funding.” More systematically,
Acharya et al. (2010) argued that the manufacture of tail risk through deliberate re-
tention of senior tranches on poor collateral by U.S. banks was an important ingredient
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of the 2008 banking crisis.
The perverse incentives to enter into (at best) zero-alpha gambles come with a
number of costs. First, they defeat the purpose of delegated asset management, which
is meant to combine “brains and resources” optimally in order to achieve superior
returns. Second, they lead to a misallocation of capital. Finally, the manufacture
of tail risk has far-reaching consequences for overall financial stability, and for the
taxpayer when gambling institutions benefit from public safety nets, either by law or
because they are systemically important.
The goal of this paper is to develop a new framework for the study of these risk-
taking incentives. We study those situations where managers find it optimal to fake
their alpha and propose a new class of contracts that eliminate any incentives to employ
such strategies.
Our model builds upon the frictionless benchmark of Berk and Green (2004), who
studied career concerns in delegated fund management. In their model, a fund manager
and investors discover the manager’s alpha-generating skills by observing her realized
returns. The excess returns that a manager is expected to generate increase with
respect to her skills, but decrease as she gains more funds under management. Com-
petitive investors supply funds to the manager until they earn a zero net (after fees)
expected return. At the beginning of each period, the manager sets fees that enable
her to reach the optimal fund size, and extract the entirety of the surplus that she
generates. Learning and competition among investors imply that both fund flows and
managerial compensation strongly depend on the manager’s record.
We add one particular friction to this model. We suppose that the manager may
secretly enter into zero-alpha trades with the sole purpose of manipulating investors’
perceptions of her skills. In what follows, we refer to this opportunistic behavior as
inefficient risk shifting or gambling. In contrast to many earlier papers on risk shifting,
we propose a general setting in which the fund manager can secretly choose to take on
positions with any arbitrary payoff distributions. This captures the large set of trading
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opportunities available to modern managers, and is therefore an important case to
consider.
We first study the impact of this friction in the case where the manager and investors
sign only short-term contracts. Three factors that are conducive to inefficient risk
shifting emerge from our analysis. The first is the size of the alpha per unit of risk
that can be generated by a skilled manager. If it is large, the history of returns has a
large impact on investors’ beliefs about the manager’s ability to generate future excess
returns. The second factor is the scalability of trading skills - that is, the sensitivity of
expected excess returns to fund size. If trading skills are scalable, a good reputation
translates into a large future fund size and thus into large future profits. Finally,
because the manager can manipulate her reputation only temporarily, she finds it
more valuable to do so when she is more impatient. These three factors determine the
convexity of future expected gains as a function of realized returns, and thus affect
inefficient risk-shifting incentives. In particular, the model predicts that “fallen-star”
managers (those who show high initial potential but who realize disappointing returns)
are particularly prone to gambling. For a calibration consistent with that of Berk and
Green (2004), we find that their efficient equilibrium with short-term contracts breaks
down, in the sense that any equilibrium must involve some degree of risk shifting.
We are able fully to characterize such equilibria with risk shifting in a simplified
version of the model, where the manager maximizes a combination of her expected
current return and the expected reputation that results from it. Interestingly, even
though we impose no restriction on the risk profiles available to the manager, we
show that she finds it optimal to manufacture hidden-tail risk. In other words, she
sells disaster insurance, and adds some noisy payoff to the collected premium so that
investors cannot discover the exact nature of the trade.
We then consider long-term contracts; and here we follow two distinct lines of
inquiry. First, we consider a contract popular in the hedge fund industry, in which the
manager’s profits are given by a performance fee above a high-water mark. Similar to
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Panageas and Westerfield (2009), we find that without new inflows/outflows triggered
by realized performance, the performance fee with high-water mark is not conducive
to inefficient risk shifting. In the presence of fund flows, however, we show that the
high-water mark contract does not generally solve the risk-shifting problem.
Second, we exhibit an optimal contract that fully eliminates risk-shifting incen-
tives. The contract is designed to discriminate between skills and luck. It exploits the
fact that the impact of gambling on investors’ beliefs vanishes in the long-run, when
true skills are eventually revealed. The contract consists in deferring payments to the
manager at dates that vary depending on her cumulative performance. The promised
payment also evolves in order that it always at least matches the managers outside
options, thereby leading her not to renegotiate the contract. As we detail in Section 3,
this mechanism is highly reminiscent of the recent proposals for bankers’ compensation
reforms issued both by public authorities and the industry itself. All such proposals
consist of a deferral of bonuses together with a clawback mechanism ensuring that the
initial promised payment is revised with the benefit of hindsight. We offer theoreti-
cal foundations for these proposals. More importantly, we qualify them, suggesting in
particular that it is important to adjust the timing of the compensation dynamically,
notably by further postponing it upon observing a poor track record. In our model,
committing to pay a bonus at a fixed date may generate inefficient gambling in general,
even if this date is remote and even if the bonus is adjusted via a clawback provision.
The dynamic revision of the payment date turns out to be important, and yet it is
absent from the current suite of proposed reforms.
To our knowledge this paper is the first to derive a formal connection between fund
managers’ career concerns and alpha-faking through hidden-tail risk in a fully rational
environment. More precisely, we bridge two strands of literature, namely that on risk
shifting and that on career concerns. The risk-shifting friction was first introduced by
Jensen and Meckling (1976) as a source of value destruction within overly leveraged
firms. Arguably, this friction is particularly relevant in the context of sophisticated
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financial institutions that can swiftly alter their risk profiles. Accordingly, there is a
large amount of literature on asset pricing that considers the impact of nonconcave
objective functions on the risk-shifting incentives of fund managers who have access
to dynamically complete markets. Contributions include those of Basak, Pavlova, and
Shapiro (2007), Carpenter (2000), and Ross (2004). In common with them, we seek to
identify the risk-taking strategies that optimally respond to nonconcave objectives. We
extend this line of research in two directions. First, nonconcavities in the manager’s
objective are not assumed in our model. Rather, they arise endogenously from reputa-
tional concerns in a truly dynamic environment. Second, we exhibit optimal contracts
that eliminate the costs of this friction.
Acharya, Pagano, and Volpin (2012) also developed a model in which career con-
cerns may lead managers to destroy value, but by a different means from that of
manipulating a payoff distribution. As in our model, limited commitment prevents
managers from receiving insurance against the risk that their reputation deteriorates.
It is assumed that learning about managerial skills can take place only if managers run
the same project for sufficiently long. Thus risk-averse managers may prefer to churn
across projects in order to prevent learning. Whilst this shields them from reputational
risk, it inefficiently slows down the identification of good managers. Malliaris and Yan
(2012) considered a two-period model in which a manager may be tempted to take on
tail risk in order to manipulate her expected reputation. Their setup is related to the
static version of our model, which we solve for equilibria with risk shifting. In our case
the main difference is that we do not impose binary payoffs, as they do.
Our paper is also related to that of Goetzmann et al. (2007), who studied manipulation-
proof measures of managerial performance. They showed that to be manipulation-proof
a measure should take the form of a concave utility function averaged over the return
history. We also show that if the fund manager has a nonconcave continuation utility
she can engage in inefficient risk shifting, and that optimal contracts are aimed at
concavifying the manager’s objective .
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Finally, our study relates to two recent extensions of the Berk and Green (2004)
model. First, Berk and Stanton (2007) applied the Berk and Green setup to closed-end
funds. In this case, learning affects the net asset value of the fund and not its size, which
is fixed by construction. Berk and Stanton showed that the impact of learning explains
several characteristics of the closed-end fund discount, and that the behavior of this
discount crucially depends on the nature of the compensation contract. Second, Dang,
Wu, and Zechner (2008) studied an extension of Berk and Green’s approach in which
a management company can fire a manager if her performance is not good enough.
They restricted their analysis to short-term compensation contracts and solved for the
optimal firing rule.
The remainder of our paper is organized as follows. Section I develops our baseline
model of career concerns, and studies the impact of the risk-shifting friction when the
manager and investors sign only short-term contracts. Section II studies long-term
contracts. Section III concludes. Technical proofs are relegated to the appendix.
I. Career Concerns and Inefficient Risk Shifting
In Section A, we introduce and solve a frictionless model of career concerns in
delegated asset management that closely follows the approach used by Berk and Green
(2004). In Section B, we introduce a risk-shifting friction to this benchmark approach,
and study its impact on the equilibrium in the presence of short-term contracts. In
Section C, we fully characterize equilibria with risk shifting in a simplified version of
our baseline model. In Section D, we discuss the costs of risk-shifting strategies.
A. Frictionless Benchmark: The Berk and Green model
Time is discrete and is indexed by {n∆t} , where n ∈ N and ∆t > 0. There is
a single consumption good which serves as the nume´raire. Agents are of two types:
a manager and investors. Agents live forever, are risk-neutral, and discount future
6
consumption at the instantaneous rate r > 0.
The manager is protected by limited liability and is thus unable to have negative
consumption. Investors receive a large endowment of the consumption good at each
date n∆t, the manager does not. The manager has exclusive access to an investment
technology. If the manager invests qt consumption units at date t using her technology,
she generates qt+∆t units at date t+ ∆t such that
qt+∆t = qte
(
r+aθ−c(qt)−σ22
)
∆t+σ(Bt+∆t−Bt), (1)
where (Bt)t≥0 is a standard Wiener process, and a and σ are strictly positive numbers.
The parameter θ ∈ {0, 1} measures the manager’s skills. It is unobservable by
both the manager and investors. All other parameters are common knowledge. The
parameter a is the alpha that a skilled manager can generate with her first dollar.
As in Berk and Green (2004), the cost c(qt) captures the fact that many arbitrage
opportunities or informational rents in financial markets are not perfectly scalable.
The function c is increasing, taking the form
c(q) = βq
1
α−1 , (2)
where α ≥ 1, β > 0.
All agents share the common date - 0 prior to which the manager is endowed with
high skills – that is, that θ = 1 – with probability pi0 ∈ (0, 1). Except for the manager’s
skills, each action and the manager’s realized returns are publicly observable at each
date n∆t. Thus, information is symmetric across agents.
Let pit denote the probability that the agents assign to the possibility that the
manager is skilled at a given date t. We will refer to pit as the manager’s perceived
skills. Given pit = pi, the net expected surplus created over [t, t+ ∆t] if the manager
invests q units is
q
(
pie(a−c(q))∆t + (1− pi)e−c(q)∆t − 1) ,
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which in the limit as ∆t → 0 becomes q (api − c(q)) . Thus the manager creates the
maximal net expected surplus over [t, t+ ∆t] if she invests q (pi) that solves
q(pi) = arg max
q
q
(
pie(a−c(q))∆t + (1− pi)e−c(q)∆t − 1) .
We will refer to such q(pi) as the optimal fund size. Denoting v(pi)∆t as the maximal
expected profit over [t, t+ ∆t] that corresponds to this optimal fund size, we have:
LEMMA 1:
lim
∆t→0
q(pi) =
(
α− 1
αβ
api
)α−1
, (3)
lim
∆t→0
v(pi) = β1−α
(α− 1)α−1
αα
(api)α . (4)
Proof of Lemma 1: See Appendix.
Using a power specification (2) for the cost function c(q), the expected instantaneous
surplus v (pi) is proportional to piα as ∆t becomes small. The parameter α captures the
scalability of the trading skills. As α increases, the manager’s skills pi become more
scalable and therefore, her expected profit becomes more sensitive to her reputation,
in other words, it becomes more convex in pi. In the hedge fund universe, global macro
strategies are typically quite scalable. At the same time, strategies based on shareholder
activism may be more difficult to spread over increasing amounts of capital.
Berk and Green specified a linear cost function c corresponding to α = 2. They
showed that their model matches quantitatively well the empirically observed relation-
ship between realized returns of mutual funds and inflows/outflows. In the remainder
of the paper, we will generally restrict the analysis to a somewhat simpler limiting case
in which α = 1. In this case, the cost is zero for q < 1 and infinite for q > 1. Thus,
the manager can scale up the fund at no cost up to an upper bound that is (without
loss of generality) normalized to 1. The optimal fund size is thus always 1 and v(pi)
is linear in pi. In other words, in this case perceived skills affect the expected rate of
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return of the fund but the optimal fund size remains constant, normalized to 1.
To realize any surplus, investors must delegate their funds to the manager and
agree with her on the profit-sharing rule. We assume that investors are competitive
and can fully commit to a contract. At the same time, at the end of any period, the
fund manager is free to walk away from a contract and sign a new one with competing
investors. More precisely, at the end of each period [t, t+ ∆t] , after returns are realized
and all contractual transfers for the period are made, the fund manager is free to
terminate a contract without financial obligation to its investors, and to enter a new
one with new investors starting at period [t+ ∆t, t+ 2∆t]. In other words, commitment
is one-sided. This is a common assumption in labor economics. We find it to be all the
more plausible in the financial services industry where fund managers can swiftly move
between jobs and financial centres because their activity entails making few specific
investments. Limited cross-border enforcement precludes covenants that would make
such moves costly.
We first study incentives to take risk when investors and the manager cannot enter
into long-term contracts, but rather simply interact in a spot labor market at each
date. Our goal is to determine whether incentives created by market forces alone can
discipline managers who are concerned about their reputations in the labor market
We therefore postpone the analysis of explicit long-term contracts until Section II,
and instead assume, like Berk and Green, that the manager enters only into one-period
contracts with investors:
ASSUMPTION 1: At each date t, the manager offers investors a one-period asset man-
agement contract.
Assumption 1 only imposes a restriction on the horizon of contracts: The parties cannot
contract at date t on actions or transfers beyond date t+ ∆t. Parties are free to write
any one-period contracts, however, subject only to the limited-liability constraint of
the manager. We next show that this restriction to short-term contracts does not lead
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to any misallocation of capital in the absence of frictions.
LEMMA 2: Under Assumption 1, the manager adopts the optimal fund size q(pi) at
each date and extracts the maximal expected surplus v(pi)∆t.
Proof of Lemma 2: One only needs to exhibit a particular contractual arrangement
that enables the manager to raise q(pi) at each period, and to receive an expected
compensation v(pi)∆t over [t, t+ ∆t]. In the absence of any frictions, there are many
different arrangements in which this can be achieved. For example, the manager can
simply ask investors at the beginning of each period to pay her a salary v(pi)∆t, collect
funds q(pi) from them, invest, and leave them the date - (t + ∆t) proceeds. She may
alternatively, as assumed by Berk and Green (2004), quote a fee f∆t at the beginning
of each period. The fee is the fraction of the date - (t+ ∆t) assets under management
(before any new inflows/outflows of funds) that accrues to the manager. If a manager
with perceived skills pi quotes a fee f∆t, competitive investors will supply funds as
long as their net expected rate of return is equal to r. Thus, their fund supply q(f)
solves
(1− f∆t) (pie(r+a−c(q(f)))∆t + (1− pi)e(r−c(q(f)))∆t) = er∆t.
Therefore as ∆t→ 0, q (f) solves
pia = c(q(f)) + f. (5)
The manager maximizes her expected profits by choosing f such that:
f = arg max
f
f∆t× q(f) = arg max
f
(pia− c(q(f))) ∆t× q(f),
which implies that the manager collects the maximal expected surplus v(pi)∆t.
Q.E.D.
This baseline model is essentially identical to that of Berk and Green (2004). The
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main modeling difference is that the distribution of skills is binomial in our setup
while it is Gaussian in theirs. With our specification, the model is stationary in per-
ceived skills pi, and is therefore more tractable. In particular, this specification yields
a tractable formulation of the manager’s total expected profit from date 0 onwards.
While this is not particularly useful in the frictionless environment of Berk and Green,
it turns out to be instrumental when we introduce asymmetric information between
the manager and investors.
Let (pin∆t)n≥0 denote the process that describes the manager’s perceived skills at
each date. From Lemma 2, the manager’s continuation utility is
V (pi,∆t) = E
[ ∞∑
n=0
e−rn∆tv(pin∆t)∆t | pi0 = pi
]
,
where v(pi) is given by (4). The following proposition shows that this continuation
utility converges to a simple limit when ∆t becomes small.
PROPOSITION 1: Let
V (pi) = lim
∆t→0
V (pi,∆t).
We have
V (pi) =
∫ 1
0
G (pi, x) v(x)dx, (6)
where
G(pi, x) =
2σ2
ψa2x2(1− x)2
 g(1− pi)g(x) if 0 ≤ x ≤ pig(pi)g(1− x) if pi ≤ x ≤ 1 , (7)
and
ψ =
√
1 +
8rσ2
a2
, (8)
g(u) = u
1
2
+ 1
2
ψ(1− u) 12− 12ψ.
Convergence of V (pi,∆t) to V (pi) when ∆t→ 0 is uniform over pi ∈ (0, 1) .
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Proof of Proposition 1: See Appendix.
In the remainder of the paper, all results will be established for ∆t that is sufficiently
small for us to approximate the manager’s continuation utility with its continuous-time
limit (6).
Expression (6) can be interpreted as an expectation over the instantaneous surplus
v (x) weighted by a discount factor G(pi, x). The factor G(pi, x) has an intuitive in-
terpretation: it measures the discounted frequency of the future dates at which the
manager will have a perceived ability x given that she starts out with perceived skills
pi. Notice that the factor G depends only on a/σ, which governs the speed at which
agents learn about the manager’s skills, and on the discount rate r. The cost parame-
ters α and β affect only the instantaneous profit v from (4). This is because the cost is
known and thus filtered out by the agents when inferring skills from realized returns.
It is easy to verify that ∫ 1
0
G (pi, x)xdx =
pi
r
. (9)
Thus, in the case α = 1, the continuation utility V (pi) is proportional to pi.
We now depart from this frictionless benchmark set by Berk and Green, and intro-
duce informational asymmetry between the manager and investors. We posit that the
manager may secretly enter into zero-alpha trades in order to manipulate her perceived
skills temporarily as opposed to efficiently investing in the alpha-generating technology
described in (1). We will show that the spot labor market interactions considered thus
far may generate perverse incentives in the presence of this friction.
B. Risk Shifting
The Berk and Green model assumes a frictionless interaction between the manager
and investors. While this is a very useful benchmark, in reality several informational
frictions may affect the delegation of asset management to sophisticated entities such as
hedge funds and investment banks. As the following quote from the Financial Stability
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Forum “Principles for Sound Compensation Practices” suggests, the impossibility of
perfectly monitoring shifts in risk exposures within such institutions can be particularly
problematic:
In principle, if risk management and control systems were strong and
highly effective, the risk-taking incentives provided by compensation sys-
tems would not matter because risk would stay within the firm’s appetite.
In practice, all risk management and control systems have limitations and,
as the current crisis has shown, they can fail to properly control risks. The
incentives provided by compensation can be extremely powerful. Without
attention to the risk implications of the compensation system, risk man-
agement and control systems can be overwhelmed, evaded, or captured by
risk-takers.
To study such incentives for surreptitiously shifting risk exposures, we introduce
the following friction to the baseline model:
ASSUMPTION 2: (Risk-shifting technology). At each date, the manager can secretly
invest all or part of her funds in an alternative technology whose returns are perfectly
scalable and independent of the returns on the technology described in (1). This tech-
nology enables her to generate a one-period gross return with any arbitrary distribution
over [0,∞) with mean er′∆t, where r′ ≤ r. Investors observe returns realized at the
reporting and contracting dates n∆t, at which the manager’s position is marked-to-
market.
We will now briefly comment on our modeling choice. We interpret the alpha-
generating technology (1) available to the manager as the investment strategy that
she agrees with the investors and/or her supervisors. In practice this strategy may
vary over time, and involve shifts in asset selection, asset allocation, or overall risk
exposure. But such shifts are agreed between the parties. For simplicity, we abstract
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from them and, following Berk and Green, we model this agreed trading strategy as a
simple production function (1).
The “risk-shifting” technology that the manager may secretly use reflects the po-
sitions that she can conceal from the investors and /or her supervisors by evading the
various control and risk management systems put in place to monitor her. To bring
our results into sharper focus, we assume that these trades are detrimental to investors
in that they do not generate a positive risk-adjusted expected excess return. Moreover,
we allow for the possibility that concealing these trades from investors comes at a cost
r−r′. The assumption that these trades are independent of the alpha-generating tech-
nology ensures that they cannot be used for arbitrage purposes. Because such trades
yield less in terms of expectation than the manager’s alpha-generating technology (1),
she will not invest her own funds in them. In the presence of career concerns, however,
the manager may be tempted to use the “risk-shifting” technology because it provides
her with an opportunity to manipulate investors’ beliefs about her reputation.
Given the large set of trading opportunities available to sophisticated managers, we
consider a general setting in which the fund manager can secretly choose any arbitrary
payoff distribution. One of the questions we are interested in relates to understanding
which trades work best in manipulating investors’ beliefs. For expositional simplicity,
we assume the perfect scalability of these trades. It is straightforward matter to extend
our analysis to the case in which large trades are more difficult to hide than small trades.
The manager in our model may literally be interpreted as an individual trader, or
may alternatively be a desk or a division that collectively decides to breach its mandate
or exceed its risk limits. In the remainder of the paper, we refer to the secret use of
this inefficient technology by the manager, as opposed to the transparent risk taking
induced by the alpha-generating technology (1), as “risk shifting” or “gambling”.
We now study whether the friction introduced in Assumption 2 affects the outcomes
in the Berk and Green environment for short-term contracts (Assumption 1). The first
type of opportunistic behavior could occur if the manager secretly invests a portion of
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her funds at the risk-free rate r′, rather than using her alpha-generating technology.
This represents the case where a manager performs well from January to November,
say, and then prefers to stop investing actively in order to lock in a profit. We then
have the following result.
PROPOSITION 2: If
r′ ≤ r − σ2/2, (10)
then the manager does not secretly invest at the risk-free rate.
Proof of Proposition 2: See Appendix.
The remainder of the paper focuses on situations in which the manager uses the
risk-shifting technology to increase rather than reduce risk. We believe that this is a
more important question because such excessive risk taking could contribute to financial
instability, as suggested by the recent financial crisis . We therefore assume in what
follows that condition (10) holds.
We now characterize the manager’s incentives to gamble secretly (and inefficiently).
Suppose that the economy is in an equilibrium in which investors believe that the
manager always invests in the alpha-generating technology (1). We assess whether the
manager could be tempted to deviate and enter into a one-shot gamble.
Suppose therefore that the manager gambles during her first trading round, realizes
a return R, and from then on does not gamble. Suppose that investors believe instead
that she has never gambled. Let pin∆t be the manager’s (correct) belief about her skills
at date n∆t and let piRn∆t be investors’ (incorrect) perception of her skills at date n∆t.
We have
PROPOSITION 3:
piRt ≡ lim
∆t→0,n∆t→t
piRn∆t =
pitR
a
σ2
1− pit + pitR
a
σ2
. (11)
Proof of Proposition 3: See Appendix.
15
Remark. In principle, a realization of R = 0 should perfectly reveal to investors
that the manager gambled because her alpha-generating technology delivers strictly
positive returns with a probability of one. We assume instead that piRt is continuous
at zero, so that investors infer pi = 0 from observing R = 0. Equivalently, we could
assume that traders who are caught gambling are excluded from the market.
The continuation utility of the manager after the return R is realized is
W (pi,R,∆t) = E
[ ∞∑
n=0
e−rn∆tv(piRn∆t)∆t|pi0 = pi
]
.
For ∆t small, (6) and (11) imply that:
W (pi,R) ≡ lim
∆t→0
W (pi,R,∆t) =
∫ 1
0
G (pi, x) v
(
xR
a
σ2
1− x+ xR aσ2
)
dx. (12)
Notice that as ∆t→ 0 the mean of the gamble, er′∆t, converges to one irrespective of
r′. The manager therefore chooses a unit mean gamble whose distribution maximizes
her expectation over W (pi,R). Formally, denoting M the set of Borelian probability
measures over [0,+∞), she solves
max
µ∈M
∫ ∞
0
W (pi,R) dµ(R) (13)
s. t.
∫ ∞
0
Rdµ(R) = 1.
In the electronic appendix, we show that the generic solution to (13) is attained using
a binary gamble - or a measure comprised of two atoms, one above 1 and the other
below. If these two atoms coincide at 1, the manager does not find it worthwhile to
gamble, and an equilibrium without inefficient risk shifting can be sustained. If they
do not, then the optimal binary gamble is not degenerate, which means that such an
equilibrium without risk shifting does not exist.
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Obviously, a sufficient condition that makes gambling undesirable is that W (pi,R)
is concave in R. More generally, the optimal gamble is determined by the convexity
properties of W (pi,R), which in turn depend on the parameters a, σ, α, and r. We
have the following result.
PROPOSITION 4: Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold.
i) If
a
σ2
≤ 1
α
, (14)
then there exists an equilibrium in which the manager extracts the entire expected
surplus and does not engage in risk shifting.
ii) If
a
σ2
>
1
α
and r >
α(α− 1)a2
2σ2
(15)
then such an equilibrium does not exist.
Proof of Proposition 4: See Appendix.
To gain a better understanding of the results in Proposition 4, suppose that the
manager tries to “pick up nickels in front of a steamroller”, in other words, she gambles
and realizes an instantaneous return of 1+ε with probability 1/(1+ε), where ε is small,
or loses everything. Then from (11), in case of success, her new reputation is
piR =
pi (1 + ε)
a
σ2
1− pi + pi(1 + ε) aσ2 ,
which for pi and ε small enough is approximately
piR ' pi0
(
1 +
a
σ2
ε
)
. (16)
Further, Lemma 6 in the Appendix shows that if r is not too small, then the continu-
ation utility of the manager V (pi) behaves as piα as pi → 0. Therefore, the manager’s
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net expected gain from the gamble for pi and ε small enough is proportional to
1
1 + ε
(
piR
)α − piα ' piα (αa
σ2
− 1
)
ε. (17)
Thus, whether there is risk shifting or not depends on whether the ratio αa/σ2 is
greater or less than 1.
Proposition 4 shows that risk shifting is particularly appealing when three condi-
tions are met. First, managerial skills generate a high alpha per unit of risk (a/σ2 is
large). One can see from (16) that in this case, realized returns have a large impact
on investors’ beliefs. Second, the manager’s skills are sufficiently scalable (α is large).
In this case, positive news about her skills translates into a large increase in expected
future fund size, and thus into large future expected profits. Finally, the manager
should be sufficiently impatient (r is large). If the manager is patient, she cares only
for the long run in which she ends up with the reputation that she deserves regardless
of her earlier attempts to gamble. In this regard, it is worth noticing that condition
r > α(α−1)a
2
2σ2
in (15) is only a sufficient condition for risk shifting. Numerical analysis
shows that the manager is tempted to gamble under much milder conditions on r when
a/σ2 > 1/α is satisfied.
To assess whether the risk-shifting friction is likely to be important in practice,
we consider a calibration consistent with that of Berk and Green. We set α = 2,
a = 5%, σ = 25%, and r = 5%. Simple calculations then show that the conditions
(15) are satisfied. More generally, condition a/σ2 > 1/α is very likely to be satisfied
in practice. It holds whenever the Sharpe ratio of a portfolio strategy is larger than
its volatility (a/σ > σ), which is true for almost all investment strategies. In sum,
this suggests that risk shifting matters in this model for parameter values that are
empirically plausible.1
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C. Equilibria with Risk Shifting
Proposition 4 establishes that under the plausible conditions (15), an equilibrium
without gambling does not exist. This raises the following questions: Under these
conditions, which gambles emerge in equilibrium? How does gambling in equilibrium
affect learning and the distribution of realized returns?
To answer these questions, we consider a reduced-form version of our model. It
allows us to abstract from complex signalling issues that would arise in an infinite
horizon dynamic model, but nevertheless yields interesting insights into equilibrium
gambling strategies.2
Specifically, we study the following static model. We assume that the manager
makes only one investment decision: She can invest one unit of capital using one of
two technologies. She can either use an alpha-generating technology, which produces
a gross return
eaθ−σ
2/2+σξ, ξ ∼ N(0, 1), (18)
where again θ ∈ {0; 1} is the unknown ability of the manager. Alternatively, she can
invest her funds in the risk-shifting technology that enables her to generate a gross
return with any arbitrary distribution over [0,+∞) with unit mean.
Investors and the manager share the common prior beliefs pi0 that the manager is
skilled (θ = 1). Upon observing the return R realized by the manager - but without
knowing if she gambled or used the alpha-generating technology - investors update
their beliefs about the manager’s skills. As before, we denote piR1 = Prob{θ = 1|R} the
investors’ posterior belief that θ = 1, and refer to it as the manager’s reputation.
We assume that the manager invests in order to maximize the sum of her expected
current return R and a reduced-form continuation utility that is proportional to her
reputation piR1 :
maxE
(
γR + piR1
)
, γ > 0.
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Assuming a continuation utility that is linear in reputation is commonplace in the
literature on career concerns (see, for example, Dasgupta and Prat (2008), Holmstrom
and Ricart I Costa (1986), and Scharfstein and Stein (1990)). It is also consistent with
what the manager obtains in our dynamic model when the fund size is fixed (α = 1).
Lemma 3, similar to Proposition 4, shows that if a > σ2 then an equilibrium without
gambling does not exist.
LEMMA 3: If a > σ2 and pi0 is sufficiently low, then there exists no equilibrium without
gambling.
Proof of Lemma 3: See Appendix.
We now assume that the conditions in Lemma 3 are satisfied, and characterize
an equilibrium with gambling. As before, we assume that the manager who is caught
gambling is excluded from the market and attains zero utility. Thus, in any equilibrium
with gambling, the manager cannot gamble with a probability of one. Notice that if the
manager decides to gamble she should choose a distribution for her returns that has no
atoms other than at zero. Suppose otherwise that investors believe that a particular
return Rˆ > 0 occurs with a strictly positive probability. Because the distribution of
returns of the efficient technology has no atoms then upon observing Rˆ investors would
conclude that the manager gambles and penalize her with zero payoff. In this case,
the manager would be better off by setting Rˆ to zero in the first place and using the
realized surplus to improve the distribution of returns.
The foregoing observations imply that the investment strategy of the manager can
be summarized as follows. The manager invests in her alpha-generating technology
with probability (1 − q) and gambles with probability q ∈ (0, 1) . In the latter case,
she chooses a gamble that pays off 0 with probability x ≥ 0 and, conditionally on not
yielding 0, admits an atomless density ϕ over [0,∞). The following lemma further
characterizes this strategy.
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LEMMA 4: The gamble yields 0 with a positive probability (x > 0). The density ϕ is
single-peaked and has the support [z1, z2], where 1 < z1 < z2.
Proof of Lemma 4: See Appendix.
Lemma 4 shows that equilibria with risk shifting involve trading strategies that
consist exactly in taking on hidden-tail risk. With some probability, the manager sells
disaster insurance. She uses the insurance premium to generate a noisy excess return
if the disaster does not occur. Upon observing such fake excess returns, investors still
revise their views about the manager’s skills upwards because the manager also uses
her alpha-generating technology with some probability.
The proof of Lemma 4 provides an analytical expression for ϕ. Here we consider a
numerical example. We assume the following parameter values: σ = 10%, a = 2σ2 =
2%, pi0 = 40%, and γ = 10%.
First, we check that with these parameter values, an equilibrium without gambling
does not exist. Suppose, by contradiction, that such an equilibrium does exist. In this
case, after observing a return R, investors form a posterior belief about the manager’s
skills as
piR1 =
pi0χR
a/σ2
pi0χRa/σ
2 + 1− pi0 , χ = e
−a(a−σ2)/2σ2 .
Figure 1 Panel (a) depicts piR1 . It is increasing in R and is first convex and then concave.
[Figure 1 About Here]
If the manager does not gamble and invests in the efficient technology, her expected
future reputation coincides with the current reputation, and is pi0. The electronic ap-
pendix offers a simple procedure to check whether the manager can enhance her ex-
pected reputation by resorting to gambling. This procedure consists in finding the
straight line that has the smallest value at one among all the straight lines that are
above the graph of piR1 . The manager manipulates her reputation if and only if this
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straight line takes a value strictly larger than pi0 at R = 1. An optimal gamble has its
support included in the set where this line coincides with piR1 .
Panel (a) shows that in our example, there is an optimal gamble which delivers
either 0 or a gross return of 1.23 with probability of 80%. The expected reputation
from such a gamble is 40.6% > 40%. The gains in expected reputation from gambling
come at the cost of the lower expected returns. If the manager gambles, the expected
return is only 1, while it is pi0e
a + (1 − pi0) = 1.008 if she uses the alpha-generating
technology. Because the cost is less than the reputation gain, an equilibrium without
gambling is not sustainable.
Next, we solve for the manager’s equilibrium strategy with randomized gambling.
Figure 1 Panel (b) shows the equilibrium posterior piR1 . In contrast to that in Panel (a),
the posterior now has a linear portion over [1.02, 1.49] . In equilibrium, the manager
gambles with probability q = 5.6%. When she gambles, the manager loses everything
with probability x = 8.8% and obtains an excess return between 2% and 49% with a
density shown in Figure 1 Panel (c). The range of these returns [1.02, 1.49] corresponds
to the linear part of piR1 in Figure 1 Panel (b). The unconditional probability that the
manager goes bust is q × x = 0.5%. Thus, the manager trades an excess return with
probability 99.5% with the risk of losing everything.
While binary gambles are optimal deviations in an equilibrium in which investors
believe that the manager does not gamble, the equilibrium gambles are not binary
because this would be detected by investors. The equilibrium posterior with gambling
is flatter than the one without gambling in the region [1.02, 1.49] , where the returns
from gambling are realized. As a result, learning about managerial skills is slower in
the equilibrium with gambling.
D. What Are the Costs of Risk Shifting?
The results of Sections B and C suggest that there are three types of costs associated
with risk shifting induced by career concerns in delegated asset management. First,
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realized returns are riskier in equilibria with gambling. While in our setting investors
are risk-neutral, it would be straightforward to extend our model to one in which
investors are risk-averse. In this case, additional risk would be costly to them, unless
one assumes that gambles are purely idiosyncratic and that investors can diversify
them away. From a financial stability perspective (which is beyond the scope of our
model), the most worrying aspect of equilibrium risk shifting is that it thickens the left
tail of returns, since the manager finances small and frequent positive excess returns
with rare but devastating losses. When such incentives prevail within institutions that
have legal access to the public safety nets, or that are too big or too systemic too fail,
the induced cost for taxpayers of the occurrence of such fat-tailed returns can be very
high.
Second, the manager may give up pursuing alpha-generating strategies and invest
instead in fairly priced portfolios, which have a risk profile better suited to the manip-
ulation of her reputation. As a result, markets may not be as efficient as they would
be if the manager tried to correct any mispricing.
Finally, gambling in equilibrium slows down the discovery of managerial skills be-
cause the manager applies them less often. This leads to a less efficient allocation of
capital.
II. Long-Term Contracts and Risk Shifting
In the previous section we showed that risk shifting reduces the gains from matching
“brains and resources” through delegated asset management, and that it generates
significant tail risk for financial institutions. It also shows that risk shifting is likely to
occur in equilibrium if only one-period contracts are used.
This section introduces the possibility of long-term contracting. We perform two
different exercises. First, we consider the risk-taking incentives induced by performance
fees with high-water marks, which are commonly used in the hedge fund industry. We
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show that this contract does not eliminate the risk-shifting incentives created by the
flow-performance relationship. Second, we solve for optimal contracts that eliminate
risk shifting even when conditions (15) are satisfied.
For simplicity, this section restricts the analysis to the case in which the alpha-
generating technology is such that α = 1 in (2). In this case, reputation affects the
manager’s expected alpha, but not the optimal fund size, which is constant and equal
to 1.
A. Performance Fees with High-Water Marks
The typical fee structure in the hedge fund industry usually includes a management
fee and a performance fee. Management fees are a fixed fraction of the fund’s net asset
value ranging from 1% to 4% per annum, and are meant to cover the fund’s operating
costs. The performance fee is a fraction of the fund’s profits over a given year, ranging
from 15% to 50%. The most widespread combination is a 2% management fee and
a 20% performance fee, the so-called 2-20 contract. The performance fee typically
includes a “high-water mark” (HWM) provision, meaning that the fee applies only to
the profits in excess of the previous fund maximum. The goal of this section is to study
whether the performance fees are conducive to risk shifting in our model.
Because the terms of the contract are usually fixed, in general the manager does not
extract the maximum expected surplus but leaves some surplus to investors. This would
not be possible with the one-sided commitment assumed thus far because the manager
would enter into a new contract with higher fees if her reputation improved. Such
renegotiation by hedge fund managers is not just a theoretical possibility. In practice,
managers do adjust their fees in response to their performance. There is also ample
anecdotal evidence that fund managers tend to close funds that have underperformed
in order to reset the high-water mark.3 Nevertheless, in order to provide a meaningful
analysis, we only assume in this Section A that both investors and the manager agree
on the fees and can commit not to renegotiate them.
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To understand the risk-taking incentives created by the performance fee, we first
consider a situation in which there are no new inflows after the manager and investors
sign the contract at date 0. Specifically, we assume that both the manager and investor
can commit to the following contract: (i) At date 0, investors make an initial unit
investment in the fund; (ii) The manager receives a performance fee k with a high-
water mark equal to one and returns the fraction of the fund value in excess of 1 that
she does not receive as a performance fee to investors; (iii) There are no new inflows
to the fund.
Under the above contract, if the manager uses the alpha-generating technology, the
fund size (qt)t≥0 evolves as:
dqt = qt [(r + aθ) dt+ σdBt]− dHt, (19)
Ht =
∫ t
0
1{qs=1}dqs. (20)
Ht is the fund value in excess of 1 that is redeemed to investors after the performance
fee is paid. It is a non-decreasing adapted process that increases only when qt exceeds
the optimal fund size equal to 1. At any date t, the continuation utility of the manager
is
Wt = Et
[∫ ∞
t
e−rskdHt+s
]
. (21)
The next proposition computes this utility Wt and shows that the manager never finds
it worthwhile to gamble in this case.
PROPOSITION 5: Suppose that the manager commits to the contract described in (i),
(ii), and (iii) above. Then, she never finds gambling worthwhile and her continuation
utility is
Wt = k
(
pitρ
−1qρt + (1− pit)qt
)
, (22)
ρ =
−(r + a− σ2/2) +√(r + a− σ2/2)2 + 2rσ2
σ2
< 1.
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Proof of Proposition 5: See Appendix.
Proposition 5 shows that without new inflows, a performance fee with a high-water
mark is not sufficiently convex to trigger gambling. A similar result is established by
Panageas and Westerfield (2009). Although our results are closely related, our setting
differs from that of Panageas and Westerfield along several interesting dimensions.
Panageas and Westerfield also considered a risk-neutral fund manager who is com-
pensated according to (21). The manager cannot secretly gamble but she can take
positions in a risk-free asset and in a risky asset that carries an exogenous constant
excess return. Panageas and Westerfield found that despite risk neutrality, the man-
ager optimally maintains a finite and constant leverage. One way to understand their
result is to notice that the performance fee with high-water mark can be viewed as
a continuum of call options with varying maturities. An increase in risk raises the
value of the options with the closest maturity but it also increases the possibility that
more remote options will become far out-of-the money in case of adverse realizations.
The resulting trade-off yields a constant leverage that depends both on the manager’s
discount rate and on the excess return on the risky asset. When the latter goes to
zero, Panageas and Westerfield show that the optimal leverage goes to infinity. This
result, however, crucially depends on the assumption that the manager’s discount rate
is strictly greater than the risk-free rate.
If the manager had a discount rate greater than r in our setting, she would then find
it optimal to gamble as her reputation deteriorates. In our model, as the manager’s
reputation declines, the perceived expected return on the alpha-generating technology
goes to zero. Therefore, at some point the manager would choose to forfeit investing in
a technology that provides a small excess return but limited risk in favor of gambling
with unrestricted risk-taking possibilities. This does not occur here only because the
manager’s discount rate is equal to the risk-free rate. In this case, the manager never
trades, even in the hope of gaining small expected excess returns in exchange for more
risk.
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Proposition 5 may suggest that the HWM contract does not lead to gambling.
This conclusion, however, does not apply if fund inflows are considered. The case
of α = 1 is especially illustrative and simple. Provided that the reputation of the
manager is high enough to cover her performance fees, investors will always be willing
to supply funds until the assets under management reach their optimal size equal to
one. This drastically reduces the penalty that accrues from realizing negative returns
and therefore, from gambling.
To demonstrate this, suppose that the manager has an option to reopen her fund
once to new investors. Let q∗ be the fund size when she decides to reopen her fund. In
this case, the manager raises 1 − q∗ units of fresh capital with a high-water mark set
to one. We assume that the new investors are the first to withdraw their capital if the
total fund size exceeds the optimal fund size of one.4
Let qot and q
n
t be the respective stakes in the fund of the old and new investors after
the fund is reopened and before the stake of the old investors reaches one. Then if the
manager uses her alpha-generating technology, qot and q
n
t evolve as
dqot = q
o
t [(r + aθ) dt+ σdBt] , (23)
d(qot + q
n
t ) = (q
o
t + q
n
t ) [(r + aθ) dt+ σdBt]− dHt, (24)
Ht =
∫ t
0
1{qot+qnt =1}d(q
o
t + q
n
t ). (25)
When the stake of the old investors reaches one, they become the sole investors in
the fund again, and their capital evolves according to (19) and (20). We denote this
moment as τ1. Let τq∗ denote the time when the funds of the original investors reach
a level q∗ and the manager reopens the fund to new inflows. The manager’s expected
fees from new investors are
W n(q∗) = Et
[∫ τ1
τq∗
e−rskqnt dHt+s
]
, (26)
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where Ht given by (25). The present value of these fees is
Ee−rτq∗W n(q∗).
While W n(q∗) decreases in q∗ and reaches maximum at q∗ = 0, Ee−rτq∗ increases in q∗.
Thus, in setting q∗ that solves
sup
q∗
Ee−rτq∗W n(q∗), (27)
the manager faces a trade-off between the amount of fees she can generate from new
investors and how quickly she can receive these fees.
Gambling affects the distribution of τq∗. In particular, if the manager takes on
hidden tail risk and realizes a low return, the manager can exercise her option to raise
new funds sooner. This greatly reduces the cost of gambling and therefore provides
strong incentives to engage in risk-shifting. Of course, the option to raise new funds
is only of value to managers whose reputation is good enough that they are still able
to attract new flows after a loss. Therefore, incentives to take on hidden-tail risk are
highest for managers with a good reputation. However, this result depends on the
assumption made in this section that the manager does not renegotiate her contract
as her reputation improves. In the next section, we show that when the manager is
paid the maximum surplus she can generate, it is conversely a manager with a low
reputation who has the highest incentives to gamble. This is because a manager who
is perceived to be highly skilled has much to lose if her reputation becomes tarnished.
Under the 2/20 contract, however, a good manager does not generally extract the
maximum surplus, which makes gambling less costly. We have
PROPOSITION 6: Suppose that the manager commits to the contract described in (i)
and (ii). In addition, suppose that the manager has an option to reopen her fund to
new investors who supply funds as long as they expect to break even. If r > σ2/10 there
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then exists pi such that for all pi ≥ pi, the manager with a reputation pi gambles.
Proof of Proposition 6: See Appendix.
Proposition 6 shows that an option to receive more inflows, even if it occurs only
once, is sufficient to create gambling incentives. This suggests that typical performance
fees may be problematic in practice given that hedge funds are typically open-ended
and do actually have the option to increase their capital.
B. Optimal Contract with Contingent Bonus Deferral
Under the strong - and in our view unrealistic - assumption that the manager can
commit not to renegotiate a contract after her reputation has improved, very simple
contracts can eliminate risk shifting. For example, fully insuring the manager by guar-
anteeing a fixed wage equal to api0 per period would eliminate any incentives to gamble.
This is not feasible in the more realistic environment with one-sided commitment con-
sidered here. The manager can walk away from such an insurance contract as soon as
her reputation improves.
When commitment is one-sided, contracts must be structured in such a way that
the continuation utility of the manager at any date is at least as large as her outside
options given her current reputation. This implies that a contract for a given initial pi0
cannot be determined in isolation. Instead, all contracts for all initial skill levels depend
on each other through the channel of managerial outside options. In this section we
present contracts that eliminate risk shifting. They exploit the fact that the impact of
gambling on investors beliefs vanishes in the long run.
Before constructing these contracts, we illustrate the way they work using the
following simple contract. Suppose that investors and the manager sign the following
contract at date 0. The investors commit to invest one unit in the fund at each date
between 0 and T . The manager does not receive any payment until date T , at which
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she receives a single payment wT such that:
wT =
apiT
r
(
erT − 1) . (28)
Suppose, for now only, that after date T the manager no longer works. The date-0
present value of the payment is
E0
[
e−rTwT
]
=
api0
r
(
1− e−rT ) ,
which is exactly the present value of the excess returns that investors expect to receive
between 0 and T if the manager uses her alpha-generating technology throughout. The
contract resembles a deferred bonus with clawback provisions, whereby the manager
receives a single terminal payment that is contingent on her entire track record over
the period [0, T ], as summarized by piT .
Consider the manager’s incentives to gamble at date 0 given such a contract. As in
(13), if the manager decides to gamble she chooses a distribution µ that solves:
Π(pi, T ) ≡ max
µ
∫ ∞
0
E0
[
piTR
a
σ2
1− piT + piTR
a
σ2
|pi0 = pi
]
dµ(R) (29)
s. t.
∫ ∞
0
Rdµ(R) = 1.
The manager will not be tempted to gamble at date 0 if and only if
Π(pi0, T ) = pi0. (30)
The following lemma establishes important properties of Π(pi, T ).
LEMMA 5: For all pi ∈ (0, 1), the function Π(pi, T ) decreases with respect to T , and
is equal to pi for all T sufficiently large. Furthermore, there exists pi such that for all
pi ≥ pi, Π(pi, 0) = pi.
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Proof of Lemma 5: See Appendix.
Because Π(pi, T ) decreases with respect to T, date-0 gambling becomes less appeal-
ing as the payment date becomes more remote. This formalizes the insight that the
impact of gambling on investors’ beliefs diminishes over time. Lemma 5 implies in
particular that we can define for all pi
τ(pi) ≡ inf {t ≥ 0 : Π(pi, t) = pi} . (31)
If T ≥ τ (pi0) then the manager does not gamble at date 0. As the reputation of the
manager improves, incentives to gamble decrease. Lemma 5 shows that a manager with
a sufficiently high reputation does not gamble even if the payment is made at date-0.
In light of the foregoing, we are now ready to define an optimal contract. There
are two matters that the fixed-date single-payment contract outlined above does not
address. First, while setting the payment date at τ (pi0) deters date-0 gambling, there
is no guarantee that the manager will not be tempted to gamble as the payment date
approaches. Second, it is necessary to check that if the manager enters into a new single-
payment contract after the current one expires, this does not affect her incentives to
gamble within the current contract.
We construct the optimal contract as follows. At date 0, the investors commit to
pay wT0 =
apiT0
r
(
erT0 − 1) at a random date T0 which is defined as follows. Initially, T0
is equal to τ (pi0). Then for all n ≥ 1, if T(n−1)∆t = 1, then the payment is made and the
contract ends. Otherwise, the date is revised as Tn∆t = max
{
T(n−1)∆t − 1; τ(pin∆t)
}
.
After the payment of this current contract is made, a new similar contract is initiated
at date T with initial reputation piT . We have:
PROPOSITION 7: If the manager is compensated according to a sequence of single-
payment contracts such that a contract that starts at date t promises the payment
apiT
r
(
erT − 1) at a random date T defined as above, she never gambles and extracts the
maximum expected surplus.
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Proof of Proposition 7: Investors can commit to this contract because by con-
struction, investors break even ex-ante. We therefore only need to prove two remaining
results: first that the manager’s continuation utility is higher than her outside option
at any date, and second that the manager never finds it optimal to gamble.
In respect of the first point, we define the random payment date of the current
contract as T . At date t, the manager expects to receive:
Et
[
e−r(T−t)
(
wT +
apiT
r
)]
=
ertapit
r
≥ apit
r
.
In respect of the second point, we observe that by construction, the random pay-
ment date T is such that the manager has no incentive to gamble in order to increase
the expected payment from the current contract. It may still be the case that the
manager finds it worthwhile to gamble to increase her expected payoff on the subse-
quent contracts that follow the terminal payment of the current one. Notice that from
Lemma 5, the case that is the most conducive to gambling is if all the payments from
subsequent contracts were made once and for all at date T . Even in this case, the
expected payment is apiT
r
, which is proportional to wT =
apiT
r
(
erT − 1) , and thus not
conducive to gambling.
Q.E.D.
Notice that this contract can be implemented in practice with share grants to the
manager instead of cash bonuses provided that i) the manager is sufficiently senior
or important within the firm that her decisions actually affect the share price, ii)
the vesting schedule is stochastic, depending on the manager’s entire track record as
described above.
It is interesting to compare this contract with the one that emerges from models
of dynamic moral hazard such as, for example, DeMarzo and Sannikov (2006) or He
(2009). In these models, an agent may secretly divert cash flows instead of reporting
her entire output to the principal. The optimal contract in this case consists, as in
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ours, in adjusting the present value of the future payments promised to the agent as
her track record evolves.
However, the timing conditions of the future payments are rather different in those
contracts compared with ours. In our contract it is crucial that the investors can com-
mit to not accelerating the timing of payments upon observing a stellar performance.
In moral-hazard models, a stellar track record results in accelerated payments being
made to the agent.
This difference arises because the contracts are driven by different economic con-
siderations. In our model, a stream of fixed promised payments would completely
eliminate any risk-shifting incentives. However, such fixed payments are not viable
because investors are forced to adjust the manager’s continuation value as her repu-
tation improves. If not, a good track record would lead the manager to repudiate her
current labor contract and sign a new one that reflects her new improved reputation.
The necessity of adjusting the continuation value creates risk-shifting incentives that
can be addressed by the investors’ commitment to deferring payments.
In contrast, in moral-hazard models, an adjustment of continuation values is meant
to provide the agent with incentives to report the highest possible output instead of
diverting some of it. Thus, the sooner the agent reports high income, the better.
C. Current Financial Reforms and Contingent Bonus Deferral Con-
tract
There is a widely shared view that inappropriate compensation schemes within the
financial services industry were one of the ingredients that led to the financial crisis
that erupted in 2008. According to “Principles for Sound Compensation Practices,”
published by the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) and summarizing the outcome of
multiple surveys of financial institutions “over 80 percent of market participants believe
that compensation practices played a role in promoting the accumulation of risks that
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led to the current crisis.”
In the face of these compensation issues, public authorities around the world have
issued guidelines for compensation reforms. These guidelines prominently feature the
deferral of bonuses and the introduction of clawback mechanisms. For example, in
the U.S., the Guidance on Sound Incentive Compensation Policies, jointly issued by
several authorities,5 lists four methods of making compensation more sensitive to risk,
including “deferral of payment” with explicit mention of clawbacks, “longer perfor-
mance periods”, and a “reduced sensitivity to short-term performance”. The Financial
Stability Forum points to similar tools, and writes: “One way to align time horizons is
to place a portion, and in some cases up to the entirety, of any given year’s bonus grant,
both cash and equity, into the equivalent of an escrow account. All or part of the grant
is reversed if the firm as a whole performs poorly, or if the exposures the employee
caused the firm to assume in the year for which the bonus was granted perform poorly
(a clawback).”
The industry is gradually beginning to follow this guidance. The International In-
stitute of Finance, surveying the practices of 37 financial institutions representing more
than half of global banking activity, concludes6: “The industry has begun to take steps
to strengthen the link between delivery of deferred compensation and the continued
performance of the individual. Over 40% of the firms surveyed include performance-
based criteria in their deferred compensation schemes, although in a majority of cases
this takes simply the form of a penalty for gross misconduct or large-scale unexpected
losses. A number of firms have developed more sophisticated approaches that incorpo-
rate a final payout multiplier that adjusts compensation up or down based on current
year or historical performance.”
Interestingly, the stochastic payment dates that we introduce in this section strongly
resemble this introduction of bonus deferral and clawbacks. While our optimal contract
follows the spirit of these reforms, we believe that it also introduces some important
caveats. Our model suggests that setting the bonus payment date once and for all is in
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general not optimal, even if the terminal bonus is adjusted for subsequent performance.
Additionally, it is important to commit to adjusting the payment date as events unfold.
For example, our analysis shows that a three-year deferral might induce excessive risk
taking at the end of year 2 if the manager has not performed well and the bonus is due
in one year.
III. Conclusion
Financial innovation has come under severe criticism after the crisis that erupted in
2007 . Several papers have documented that a number of structured products appeared
mostly to be aimed at exploiting investors’ weaknesses or ignorance.7 In this paper, we
suggest that by enlarging the set of financial instruments available to fund managers,
financial innovation may exacerbate agency costs even when investors are sophisticated,
provided that investors cannot perfectly monitor the positions of the fund managers.
We introduce a novel framework to study this agency problem between managers
and investors. In this framework, managers’ compensation depends on investors’ per-
ception of their ability to generate excess returns above a fair compensation for risk
(alpha). The managers can temporarily distort the perception of these alpha-generating
skills by trading a rich menu of financial instruments.
The model delivers two main implications. First, in the absence of careful contract-
ing, this friction may lead managers to take on hidden-tail risk in order to distort their
perceived skills temporarily. Second, while current compensation reforms based on the
deferral and clawback of bonuses appear to be an appropriate tool for addressing this
issue, in their current form these reforms miss the point that the payment dates must
be dynamically adjusted as the cumulative performance of the manager evolves.
In general, there are ways of dealing with risk shifting in delegated asset man-
agement other than through the design of compensation. Possible solutions include
increased transparency, or restrictions on the set of instruments that managers can
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trade. In this paper we focus on solving the risk-shifting problem using compensation
design alone. This makes the problem more challenging. Future research could com-
bine optimal contracting with these additional means of addressing the risk-shifting
problem. On the other hand, we assume that positions are always valued at a fair
market price. Instruments that are more difficult to value such as illiquid securities
or exotic derivative contracts are likely to provide fund managers with additional risk-
shifting incentives if trading losses can be concealed for some time. Future research
could further explore these channels in an attempt to engage in risk transformation.
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Notes
1Our results are also broadly supported by empirical findings of Brown, Harlow, and
Starks (1996) and Chevalier and Ellison (1997), who show that mutual fund managers
tend to take on more risk following their disappointing performance.
2In an equilibrium with gambling, unlike in an equilibrium without gambling, the
manager and investors possess different information about the manager’s ability. While
the manager knows whether she gambled or not, investors can only imperfectly infer
this from the observed returns. This creates room for signaling, whereby a truly skilled
manager would like to distinguish herself credibly from a lucky gambler. Solving for
such equilibria with asymmetric information is a very difficult problem and is beyond
the scope of this paper.
3See, for example, G. Zuckerman, “Andor Haunted by a Bad Bet,” July 15th, 2004,
Wall Street Journal; A. Stone, “Hedge Funds: Fees Down? Close Shop,” Bloomberg
Business Week, August 7th, 2005; or “Hedge-Fund Closures: Quitting While They’re
Behind,” The Economist, February 18th, 2012.
4This assumption makes gambling less likely because it decreases the manager’s
expected fees from opening the fund to new investors, and thus makes gambling more
costly.
5Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Reserve, Federal Deposit Insur-
ance Corporation, Treasury, and Office of Thrift Supervision.
6In “Compensation in Financial Services, Industry Progress and the Agenda for
Change,” March 2009. The International Institute of Finance is the leading global
association of financial institutions.
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7For example, Coval, Jurek, and Stafford (2009a) and Coval, Jurek, and Stafford
(2009b) contended that senior CDO tranches aimed at exploiting the misperception
of correlation risk by rating agencies, and that of systematic exposure by investors.
Henderson and Pearson (2011) considered a class of structured equity products offered
at prices that are hard to reconcile with purchasers’ rationality.
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Appendix. Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1: As ∆t→ 0, the optimal fund size and maximal expected surplus
solve
lim
∆t→0
q(pi) = arg max
q
q(pia− βq 1α−1 ),
lim
∆t→0
v(pi) = max
q
q(pia− βq 1α−1 ).
Direct computations show that
lim
∆t→0
q(pi) =
(
α− 1
αβ
api
)α−1
,
lim
∆t→0
v(pi) = β1−α
(α− 1)α−1
αα
(api)α .
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 1: We first show point-wise convergence. That is, we establish (6)
for a fixed pi0 = pi. By Bayes’ theorem, pin∆t, the perceived skills at date n∆t, satisfy
pin∆t =
pi0ϕn∆t
1− pi0 + pi0ϕn∆t , (A1)
where
ϕn∆t = exp
{
a
σ2
(
a
(
θ − 1
2
)
n∆t+ σBn∆t
)}
(A2)
is the likelihood ratio process. Let us introduce the continuous-time process (pit)t≥0
that obeys
dpit =
a
σ
pit(1− pit)dBt, pi0 = pi,
where Bt =
1
σ
(
θat+ σBt − a
∫ t
0
pisds
)
. Then (Bt)t≥0 is a standard Wiener process
under the agents’ filtration (see Liptser and Shiryaev (1978)). Further, as ∆t → 0
and n∆t → t, pin∆t → pit a.s. (see Liptser and Shiryaev (1978)). Hence, V (pi) can be
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written as
V (pi) = E0
∫ ∞
0
e−rtv(pit)dt,
s.to dpit =
a
σ
pit(1− pit)dBt, pi0 = pi. (A3)
By the Feynman-Kac formula, the function V solves the following linear second-order
differential equation:
a2
2σ2
pi2(1− pi)2V ′′(pi)− rV (pi) + v(pi) = 0. (A4)
From (A3) it follows that
V (0) = v(0)/r, V (1) = v(1)/r. (A5)
The corresponding homogeneous equation
a2
2σ2
pi2(1− pi)2V ′′(pi)− rV (pi) = 0 (A6)
has two regular singular points at 0 and 1. All solutions of the homogeneous equation
are linear combinations of the two independent solutions
g (pi) = (1− pi) 12 + 12ψpi 12− 12ψ, ψ =
√
1 + 8rσ2/a2,
h(pi) = g(1− pi).
From here, formulas (6) and (7) are standard results in the theory of inhomogeneous
differential equations. The function G is the Dirichlet-Green function for the differen-
tial operator associated with the homogeneous differential equation (see, for example,
Driver (2003)).
We now show that V (pi,∆t) converges to V (pi) uniformly in pi as ∆t→ 0. We have
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V (pi)− V (pi,∆t) = E
[ ∞∑
n=0
∫ (n+1)∆t
n∆t
(
e−rtv(pit)− e−rn∆tv(pin∆t)
)
dt|pi0 = pi
]
.
Thus, it is enough to show that ∀ε > 0, ∃∆t such that ∀∆t < ∆t and ∀pi ∈ [0, 1]
sup
s≤∆t
sup
pi∈[0,1]
|E (v(pis)− v(pi)) | < ε. (A7)
By change of variables (A7) can be written as
sup
s≤∆t
sup
pi∈[0,1]
|E (v̂(pi,Bs, s)− v̂(pi, 0, 0)) | < ε,
where
v̂(pi, x, t) = v
(
pi exp
{
a
σ2
(
a
(
θ − 1
2
)
t+ σx
)}
1− pi + pi exp{ a
σ2
(
a
(
θ − 1
2
)
t+ σx
)}) . (A8)
Because v is uniformly continuous over [0,1] it is enough to show that ∀pi ∈ [0, 1] and
∀ε > 0, ∃∆t such that ∀∆t < ∆t
sup
s≤∆t
|E (v̂(pi,Bs, s)− v̂(pi, 0, 0)) | < ε. (A9)
This follows from the weak convergence of the measures induced by Bs to the measure
concentrated at 0 as s→ 0.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2: Suppose that investors believe that the manager invests in
her private technology. In this case, if the manager does invest in her private technology
then pit evolves according to (A3). If, on the other hand, she invests in the risk-free
asset, pit evolves as
dpi =
a
σ
pi(1− pi)
(
r′ − r + σ
2
2
− (pia− c(qt))
)
dt.
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Suppose that at time t the manager allocates xt percentage of her funds to her alpha-
generating technology and invests the rest in the risk-free asset. Then her continuation
utility is
V (pi, x) = E0
∫ ∞
0
e−rtv(pit)dt, (A10)
s.to dpit =
a
σ
pit(1− pit)
(
(1− xt)
(
r′ − r + σ
2
2
− (pia− c(qt))
)
+ xtdBt
)
, pi0 = pi.
The optimal investment policy xt that maximizes (A10) satisfies the HJB equation:
sup
x∈[0,1]
x2ψ22V
′′ + (1− x)ψ1V ′ − rV + v = 0, (A11)
where
ψ1 =
a
σ
pit(1− pit)
(
r′ − r + σ
2
2
− (pia− c(qt))
)
< 0,
ψ2 =
a
σ
pit(1− pit) > 0.
If xt ≡ 1 then pit is a martingale and by Jensen’s inequality (v(pi) = piα)
Ev(pit) ≥ v(pi0).
Therefore, at the optimal investment policy xt, rV (pi, x) ≥ v(pi). Thus (A11) implies
that the optimal policy is indeed xt ≡ 1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3: Suppose that the manager gambles and realizes a return R
over [0,∆t], and from then on invests in her alpha-generating technology. Let
(
piRn∆t
)
n∈N
denote the process under the manager’s filtration of her skills as perceived by investors
who believe instead that she has invested in her storage technology at date 0. These
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investors believe that
R = e
(
r+θa−c(q0)−σ22
)
∆t+σB∆t .
From (A1) and (A2) it follows that
piR∆t =
pi0R
a
σ2 e
a
σ2
(
σ2
2
+c(q0)−r−a2
)
∆t
1− pi0 + pi0R
a
σ2 e
a
σ2
(
σ2
2
+c(q0)−r−a2
)
∆t
,
∀n ≥ 0, piR(n+1)∆t =
piR∆t
ϕ(n+1)∆t
ϕ∆t
1− piR∆t + piR∆t ϕ(n+1)∆tϕ∆t
. (A12)
As ∆t→ 0
lim
∆t→0
piR∆t =
pi0R
a
σ2
1− pi0 + pi0R
a
σ2
,
and
lim
∆t→0
ϕ(n+1)∆t
ϕ∆t
=
pit
1− pit
1− pi0
pi0
.
Therefore,
lim
∆t→0, n∆t→t
piRn∆t =
pitR
a
σ2
1− pit + pitR
a
σ2
. (A13)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4: Part 1. We first show that if σ2 > αa then the manager
does not engage in risk shifting. Proposition 2 demonstrates that the manager will not
invest in the alternative technology at the risk-free rate, provided that r′ < r − σ2/2.
We now show that she will not invest in any risky gamble as well.
Suppose the manager believes that she is skilled with probability pi. At the same
time, suppose that investors believe that the manager is skilled with probability pi′ and
that the manager never engages in risk shifting. We show that the manager has no
incentives to deviate by taking a one-shot risky gamble in this case.
Suppose the manager takes a gamble and realizes return R. Let W (pi, pi′, R,∆t) be
the expected utility of the manager conditional on realization a first-period return R.
Similar to the proof of Proposition 3 one can show that investors’ perception of the
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manager’s skills piRt is
piRt =
pitR
a
σ2
(1− pit) (1−pi′)pi(1−pi)pi′ + pitR
a
σ2
. (A14)
Proposition 1 implies that
lim
∆t→0
W (pi, pi′, R,∆t) =
∫ 1
0
G (pi, x) v
(
xR
a
σ2
(1− x) (1−pi′)pi
(1−pi)pi′ + xR
a
σ2
)
dx. (A15)
Differentiating twice w.r.t. R shows that this function is concave in R when σ2 ≥ αa.
Hence the manager has no incentives to take a one-shot risky gamble in this case.
Because this holds for arbitrary heterogeneous priors pi, pi′, this implies that multi-
period deviations cannot be desirable by backward induction.
Part 2. We now show that if σ2 < αa, rσ2 > a
2
2
α (α− 1) then for pi0 = pi small
enough, there exists a one-period gamble which makes the manager better off. Let
R = (1− ρ)−σ2/a, ρ ∈ [0, 1). Consider the following gamble:
 R Prob. 1/R0 Prob. 1− 1/R,
From (A15) the expected net gain from the above one-period gamble over perpetual
investment in the efficient storage technology is
∫ 1
0
G (pi, x)xαu(x, ρ)dx, (A16)
where
u(x, ρ) =
(1− ρ)σ2/a
(1− ρ(1− x))α − 1. (A17)
Since σ2 < αa, there exists x¯ and some ρ̂ ∈ (0, 1) such that for all x ∈ [0, x¯],
(1−ρ̂)σ2/a
(1−ρ̂(1−x))α > 1 + ε for some ε > 0 and therefore, u(x, ρ̂) > ε > 0. Thus for pi
small enough ∫ 1
0
G (pi, x)xαu(x, ρ̂)dx >
∫ 1
pi
G (pi, x)xαu(x, ρ̂)dx.
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Using (7) we have
∫ 1
pi
G (pi, x)xαu(x, ρ̂)dx =
2σ2
ψa2
g(pi)
∫ 1
pi
xα−
3
2
− 1
2
ψ(1− x)− 32 + 12ψu(x, ρ̂)dx. (A18)
rσ2 > a
2
2
α (α− 1) implies that ψ > 2α− 1. Therefore, the integral
∫ 1
pi
xα−
3
2
− 1
2
ψ(1− x)− 32 + 12ψu(x, ρ̂)dx
diverges as pi → 0. In this case, its sign is determined by the sign of u(·, ρ̂) in the
neighborhood of 0, which is positive. Thus, the net gain from the gamble is positive.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3: Suppose that investors believe that the manager does not
gamble. Then their posterior probability about her ability upon observing R is
pi1(R) =
pi0χR
a/σ2
pi0χRa/σ
2 + 1− pi0 , χ = e
−a(a−σ2)/2σ2 .
If the manager does not gamble, she expects to get
γ(pi0e
a + 1− pi0) + pi0. (A19)
Consider pi0 such that
4pi0(1− pi0) < χ (1 + γ(ea − 1))−2 . (A20)
Suppose that the manager deviates and enters into a gamble that generates gross return√
1−pi0
pi0χ
with probability 1/
√
1−pi0
pi0χ
and 0 otherwise. Direct computations show that in
this case, the manager expects to get
γ +
1
2
√
pi0χ
1− pi0 . (A21)
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Comparing (A21) with (A19) one can see that the manager obtains a higher utility if
she gambles, provided that (A20) holds.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4: We solve for an equilibrium in which the manager invests in
her private technology with probability 1 − q and gambles otherwise. If the manager
gambles, she receives 0 with probability x and a return between z and z + dz with
probability (1− x)ϕ(z)dz. For the ease of computations, we write ϕ(z) as
ϕ(z) =
1
z
√
2piσ2
e− ln
2(z)/2σ2g(z), (A22)
where g(z) ≥ 0. In such an equilibrium, upon observing a realized return z, investors’
posterior is8
pi1(z) = pi0
(1− q)χza/σ2 + q(1− x)g(z)
(1− q) (pi0χza/σ2 + 1− pi0) + q(1− x)g(z) , χ = e
−a(a−σ2)/2σ2 . (A23)
Let Eµ (E0) be the expectation operator if the manager gambles (invests in her
alpha-generating technology). When the manager gambles she takes the investors’
posterior pi1 in (A23) as given and chooses a gamble that solves
supEµpi1(z)
s. to Eµz = 1.
We show in the electronic appendix that the solution to this problem coincides with
the solution to its dual problem:
inf
(A,B)∈R2
A+B
s. to ∀z ≥ 0, A+Bz ≥ pi1(z), (A24)
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where A and B are some real numbers.
The dual problem admits a simple and practical interpretation: it minimizes the
value at one of a straight line that is above the graph of pi1(z). The optimal gamble
then has its support included in the set where this line coincides with pi1(z). We also
show in the electronic appendix that this solution can be realized with a binary gamble.
In this particular case, a binary gamble cannot be the equilibrium solution, however,
because it would be detected. Thus it must be that pi1(z) has linear portions that
coincide with the minimal straight line A+Bz.
Given that pi1(z) is first convex then concave, it is easy to see that there must be
two real numbers z1 and z2 such that pi1(z) = Bz for z ∈ 0 ∪ [z1, z2] and pi1(z) < Bz
otherwise. Figure 1 Panel (b) illustrates this for a particular numerical example. The
interval [z1, z2] is the support of the gamble when it does not yield 0.
We are now ready to solve for the manager’s gambling strategy. We first determine
B. Direct computations show
qEµpi1(z) + (1− q)E0pi1(z) = pi0(1− qx). (A25)
Because the manager randomizes between gambling and investing in her alpha-generating
technology, it must be that she is indifferent between gambling or investing efficiently:
Eµ (γz + pi1(z)) = E0 (γz + pi1(z)) ,
or
Eµpi1(z) = E0pi1(z) + γpi0(e
a − 1). (A26)
(A25) and (A26) together imply that
B = Eµpi1(z) = (1− qx)pi0 + γ(1− q)pi0(ea − 1). (A27)
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Since pi1(z) = Bz for z ∈ 0 ∪ [z1, z2], we can solve for g(z) from (A23):
g(z) =

(1−q)pi0χza/σ2
(
Bz+B(1−pi0)(pi0χ)−1z1−a/σ2−1
)
q(1−x)(pi0−Bz) if z ∈ [z1, z2],
0 otherwise.
(A28)
Continuity of pi1(z) implies that it must be that
pi0χz
a/σ2
i
pi0χz
a/σ2
i + 1− pi0
= Bzi, i = 1, 2,
or
1 = Bzi +B(1− pi0)(pi0χ)−1z1−a/σ
2
i , i = 1, 2. (A29)
Notice that because a > σ2, equation (A29) can have at most two solutions.
We are left with two free parameters: q and x. They are determined in equilibrium
from (i) requiring ϕ(z) to be a density and (ii) requiring the gamble to have expected
return equal to one:
∫ ∞
0
ϕ(z)dz = 1, (A30)
(1− x)
∫ ∞
0
zϕ(z)dz = 1. (A31)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5: First, suppose that the manager is skilled so that the
excess return on the alpha-generating technology is a. Whenever qt < 1 the manager’s
continuation utility is a martingale and therefore solves
0 = −rW +Wqqt(r + a) + 1
2
Wqqσ
2q2t . (A32)
The ODE (A32) has a general solution of the form
W (qt) = C+q
ρ+
t + C−q
ρ−
t ,
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where the constants ρ+ and ρ− solve the quadratic equation:
− r + ρ
(
r + a− 1
2
σ2
)
+
1
2
σ2ρ2 = 0. (A33)
Solving (A33), we have
ρ± =
− (r + a− 1
2
σ2
)±√(r + a− 1
2
σ2
)2
+ 2rσ2
σ2
. (A34)
There are two boundary conditions (at 0 and at q = 1):
lim
qt→0
W (qt) = 0,
W ′(1) = k.
Thus,
W (qt) = kρ
−1qρt , ρ =
− (r + a− 1
2
σ2
)
+
√(
r + a− 1
2
σ2
)2
+ 2rσ2
σ2
. (A35)
If the manager is unskilled then a = 0 and ρ = 1. Thus if the manager is skilled with
probability pit then her continuation utility is
W (qt) = k
(
pitρ
−1qρt + (1− pit)qt
)
. (A36)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 6: First, we compute the expected surplus that the manager
expects to get from new investors if she reopens her fund when its size is q∗. As in
Proposition 5, we first consider the case in which the manager is skilled with probability
one. Let xt = ln(q
o
t /q
∗). Then
dxt = (r + a− 1
2
σ2)dt+ σdBt, x0 = 0. (A37)
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Letmt be the running maximum of xt, mt = max0≤s≤t xt. The manager is paid whenever
xt = mt. Whenever xt < mt the manager’s continuation utility follows a martingale
and therefore solves
0 = −rW n +W nx (r + a−
1
2
σ2) +
1
2
W nxxσ
2. (A38)
The ODE (A38) has a general solution of the form
W n(xt,mt) = f(mt)e
ρ+xt + g(mt)e
ρ−xt ,
where the constants ρ+ and ρ− solve the quadratic equation (A33), and therefore are as
in (A34). f(mt) and g(mt) are arbitrary functions of mt. Because limxt→−∞W
n(xt) = 0
it must be that g(mt) ≡ 0. Without loss of generality, the solution is
W n(xt,mt) = e
ρ(xt−mt)f(mt), ρ = ρ+.
The boundary condition at xt = mt is
f ′(mt)− ρf(mt) + k(1− q∗emt) = 0. (A39)
A general solution to (A39) is
f(mt) = k
(
qemt
1− ρ +
1
ρ
)
+ Ceρmt , (A40)
where C is a constant. When qot reaches 1 for the first time, the stake of the new
investors in the fund becomes zero. It implies that f(− ln(q∗)) = 0, and therefore
W n(xot , ht) = k
(
xot
ht
)ρ(
1− hρt
ρ
+
ht − hρt
1− ρ
)
, (A41)
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where ht = q
∗emt . Thus
W n(q∗) ≡ W n(q∗, q∗) = k
(
1− (q∗)ρ
ρ
+
q∗ − (q∗)ρ
1− ρ
)
. (A42)
Cox and Miller (1965) show that
Ee−rνq∗ =
ρ− ρ−
ρ(q∗)ρ− − ρ−(q∗)ρ . (A43)
Thus, the present value of the opportunity to reopen the fund at date 0 if the manager
uses only her alpha-generating technology is
V = sup
q∗
k
ρ− ρ−
ρ(q∗)ρ− − ρ−(q∗)ρ
(
1− (q∗)ρ
ρ
+
q∗ − (q∗)ρ
1− ρ
)
. (A44)
Suppose at time 0, the manager takes a gamble that delivers a gross return q∗ < 1
with probability p and a gross return 1 + p(1 − q∗)/(1 − p) with probability (1 − p).
Suppose also that if a return q∗ is realized then the manager reopens the fund. Then
the expected continuation utility of the manager is
k
[
p
(
q∗
ρ
+W n(q∗)
)
+ (1− p)
(
p(1− q∗)/(1− p) + 1
ρ
+ V
)]
. (A45)
The manager will gamble if and only if the above utility is greater than her expected
utility if she does not gamble. Thus she will gamble if and only if
sup
q∗
W n(q∗)− (1− q
∗)(1− ρ)
ρ
> V.
Direct computations show that
sup
q∗
W n(q∗)− (1− q
∗)(1− ρ)
ρ
= 1.
The supremum is achieved at q∗ = 0. So the skilled manager will gamble if V < 1. By
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looking at ρ and ρ− one can see that they depend only on r/σ2 and a/σ2. Direct but
tedious calculations show that V < 1 as long as r/σ2 > 0.1.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5: The integrand in (29) is first convex and then concave in R. We
show in the electronic appendix that this implies that the optimal gamble is a simple
binary gamble such that for some R > 1, the manager earns R with probability 1/R,
and loses everything otherwise. Therefore,
Π(pi, t) ≡ sup
R≥1
Rλ−1E0[h(pit, R)|pi0 = pi],
where
h(pi,R) =
pi
1− pi + piRλ , λ =
a
σ2
. (A46)
For any R ≥ 1, h(pi,R) is a concave function of pi, which implies that h(pit, R) is
a super-martingale. Therefore, Π(pi, t) is a decreasing function of t. As t → ∞,
E0[h(pit, R)|pi0 = pi] → piR−λ. Therefore, for large t, Π(pi, t) ≤ piR−1, and the optimal
choice of R is one, that is not to gamble. Direct computations show that if pi > λ−1
λ
then
pi ≤ Π(pi, t) ≤ sup
R≥1
Rλ−1h(pi,R) = pi.
Q.E.D.
LEMMA 6: Suppose condition 15 holds. Then there exists a finite limit
0 < lim
pi→0
V (pi)pi−α <∞. (A47)
Proof of Lemma 6: We have
V (pi) =
∫ 1
0
G (pi, x)xαdx =
2σ2
a2ψ
 (1− pi) 12 (1+ψ)pi 12 (1−ψ) ∫ pi0 (1− x)− 12 (ψ+3)xα+ 12 (ψ−3)dx
+(1− pi) 12 (1−ψ)pi 12 (1+ψ) ∫ 1
pi
(1− x) 12 (ψ−3)xα− 12 (3+ψ)dx
 ,
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where ψ is defined in (8). Further rσ2 > a
2
2
α (α− 1) implies that ψ > 2α−1. Therefore,
∃ lim
pi→0
(1− pi) 12 (1−ψ)pi 12 (1+ψ)
∫ 1
pi
(1− x) 12 (ψ−3)xα− 12 (3+ψ)dx× pi−α <∞,
and
∃ lim
pi→0
(1− pi) 12 (1+ψ)pi 12 (1−ψ)
∫ pi
0
(1− x)− 12 (ψ+3)xα+ 12 (ψ−3)dx× pi−α <∞.
Q.E.D.
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Internet Appendix for
“Rewarding Trading Skills Without Inducing Gambling”
Optimal Risk Shifting - The Dual Approach
I have not edited from here onwards in accordance with your wishes In this Appendix,
we solve for the optimal payoff distribution, holding the mean constant, chosen by
an agent who seeks to maximize the expected value of a function U over this payoff.
Formally, let M denote the set of Borelian probability measures over [0,+∞). We seek
to solve for the following problem:
sup
µ∈M
∫ ∞
0
U(R)dµ(R)
s. t.
∫ ∞
0
Rdµ(R) = 1. (B1)
Given the primal problem (B1), its dual problem takes the following form:
P ∗(U) ≡ inf
(z1, z2)∈R2
z1 + z2
s. t. ∀y ≥ 0, z1 + yz2 ≥ U(y), (B2)
where z1 and z2 are some real numbers. Let P (U) and P
∗(U) denote the solution
of the primal and dual problems correspondingly. The dual problem minimizes the
value at 1 of a straight line that is above the graph of U . The next Proposition shows
that under the mild restriction (B3) on the utility function U , solutions to the primal
and dual problems coincide. Thus the dual approach generates a simple and practical
determination of P (U). The role of condition (B3) is to ensure that the infimum is
reached in the dual problem (B2). Graphically, it means that the function U does not
have an asymptote with a strictly positive slope.
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PROPOSITION B1: Let U : [0,+∞)→ R be a continuous function such that
lim
y→+∞
U(y)
y
= 0, (B3)
then
P (U) = P ∗(U).
Proof of Proposition B1: Observe that condition (B3) implies that the set Z =
{(z1, z2) : ∀y ≥ 0, z1 + yz2 ≥ U(y)} is nonempty, closed, and there exists K such that
(z1, z2) ∈ Z → z1 ≥ K, z2 ≥ K.
The function (z1, z2)→ z1 + z2 is continuous. Thus, there exists (z∗1 , z∗2) ∈ Z such that
P ∗(U) = z1 + z2. Condition (B3) readily implies that z2 ≥ 0.
Let µ be a probability measure that satisfies (B1). Since for any probability measure
µ that satisfies (B1):
z∗1 + z
∗
2 =
∫ ∞
0
(z1 +Rz2) dµ(R) ≥
∫ ∞
0
U(R)dµ(R),
it implies that
P ∗(U) ≥ P (U).
Let us show that the reverse inequality also holds. Without loss of generality,
we assume that U has a compact support (for all U satisfying (B3), there clearly
exists a continuous function V that has a compact support and such that V ≤ U and
P ∗(V ) = P ∗(U)). It is straightforward to see that
1. P ∗(U1) ≤ P ∗(U2) for U1, U2 such that U1 ≤ U2,
2. P ∗(λU) = λP ∗(U) for U and λ ∈ [0,+∞),
3. P ∗(U1 + U2) ≤ P ∗(U1) + P ∗(U2) for U1, U2.
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Thus, P ∗(·) is a positively homogeneous and subadditive functional. The Hahn-
Banach Theorem therefore implies that for any U there exists a positive linear func-
tional LU , defined on continuous functions with a compact support, such that LU ≤ P ∗
and LU(U) = P
∗(U). By the Riesz representation Theorem, there exists a Borelian
measure µU on [0,∞) such that for all V
LU(V ) =
∫ ∞
0
V (R)dµU(R).
For M > 1, let uM , vM be continuous functions with a compact support such that
uM(x) = 1 on [0,M ] , x ≥M → uM ≤ 1,
vM(x) = x on [0,M ] , x ≥M → vM ≤M.
Clearly,
P ∗(uM) = P ∗(vM) = 1
Then
LU(uM) =
∫ ∞
0
uM (R) dµU(R) ≤ P ∗(uM) = 1,
LU(vM) =
∫ ∞
0
vM (R) dµU(R) ≤ P ∗(vM) = 1.
Letting M → +∞ implies
∫ ∞
0
dµU(R) ≤ 1,
∫ ∞
0
RdµU(R) ≤ 1,
and thus
P ∗(U) = LU(U) =
∫ ∞
0
U(R)dµU(R) ≤ P (U).
Q.E.D.
PROPOSITION B2: Assume U satisfies (B3), and is continuous and increasing. If the
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solution to the problem (B1) is non-degenerate (µ(1) 6= 1) then P (U) can be attained
with a binary payoff. Moreover, if U is twice differentiable and has at most one
inflexion point, then a necessary and sufficient condition for the solution to (B1) to be
non-degenerate is that U ′(1) > U(1) − U(0). The binary payoff in this case is of the
form {0, R}, where R > 1.
Proof of Proposition B2: Let a continuous increasing function U satisfy condition
(B3). Let (z1, z2) ∈ R2 be the solution to the dual problem (B2) associated with U .
Clearly, z2 > 0. Let
S = {y ≥ 0 : z1 + z2y = U(y)} .
Condition B3 and continuity of U imply that S is a nonempty compact set. Let
y1 = minS, y2 = maxS.
We now proceed in two steps.
Step 1. First, we show that y1 ≤ 1 ≤ y2. We prove that y2 ≥ 1. The proof that
y1 ≤ 1 is symmetric. Suppose the opposite that y2 < 1 then for some ε ∈ (0, 1− y2) ,
let
η (ε) = min
y≥y2+ε
{
z1 − U(y)
y
+ z2
}
.
Condition B3 and continuity of U imply that η (ε) > 0.
Define (z′1, z
′
2) as z
′
1 = z1 + (y2 + ε) η (ε) , z
′
2 = z2 − η (ε) . The pair (z′1, z′2) satisfies
(B2). To see this, notice that z′1 + yz
′
2 = z1 + yz2 + η (ε) (y2 + ε− y) . Thus z′1 + yz′2 >
z1 + yz2 ≥ U(y) for y < y2 + ε. Further, z′1 + yz′2 ≥ z1 + yz2− η (ε) y ≥ U(y) for
y ≥ y2 + ε by definition of η (ε) . At the same time,
z′1 + z
′
2 = z1 + z2 + (y2 + ε− 1) η (ε) < z1 + z2,
which contradicts the definition of (z1, z2). Thus it must be that y2 ≥ 1.
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Step 2. If y1 = y2, then Step 1 implies that S = {1} , and the gamble is degenerate.
If y1 < y2, we have
z1 + y1z2 = U(y1),
z1 + y2z2 = U(y2),
so that
z1 + z2 =
1− y1
y2 − y1U(y2) +
y2 − 1
y2 − y1U(y1). (B4)
From (B4), P (U) = P ∗ (U) is attained with a payoff equal to y1 with probability
y2−1
y2−y1
and y2 with probability
1−y1
y2−y1 .
We now prove the last part of the proposition. If U has at most one inflexion point,
condition (B3) implies that U is either concave - in which case the gamble is degenerate
- or convex then concave. Consider the latter case. If the solution is degenerate then
P ∗(U) must be solved by the tangent to U at 1, which requires U ′(1) ≤ U(1)− U(0).
Suppose now that U ′(1) ≤ U(1) − U(0). It implies that U is concave over [1,+∞)
(because U(y)−U(0)
y
is decreasing in y = 1). In this case, the tangent to U at 1 solves
P ∗(U), so the gamble is degenerate. Finally, if the solution is nondegenerate then it is
attained with a tangent that starts at 0.
Q.E.D.
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Figure 1. Taking on hidden tail risk. Figure 1 illustrates an example considered in Section C.
Parameter values are as follows: σ = 10%, a = 2σ2 = 2%, pi0 = 40%, and γ = 10%. Panel (a), solid
blue line, shows a reputation of the manager at date 1 as a function of the realized gross return R
when investors believe that the manager does not gamble. The optimal gamble delivers either 0 or a
gross return of 1.23 with probability of 80%. Panel (b), solid blue line, displays a reputation of the
manager in the equilibrium in which investors rationally take into account that the manager gambles.
In equilibrium, the manager gambles with probability q = 5.6%. When she gambles, the manager loses
everything with probability x = 8.8% and obtains a gross return between 1.02 and 1.49. Panel (c)
shows the gamble’s density.
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